Authored By: Ifeoluwa Florence Omonayin
University of Ilorin
Case Title: Solomon Okedara v Attorney General of the Federation
Citation: (CA/L/174/18, Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, 28 February 2019).
Court
Court of Appeal (Lagos Division); panel of Tijjani Abubakar JCA, Abimbola Obaseki-Adejumo JCA, and J.Y. Tukur JCA
Date of Judgment
28 February 2019.
Parties involved
Appellant: Mr Solomon Okedara (public-interest claimant challenging the constitutionality of s 24(1) of the Cybercrimes Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015)
Respondent: Attorney-General of the Federation (representing the Federal Government).
Facts of the Case
Introduction
The case of Solomon Okedara v Attorney General of the Federation (2019) is a significant Nigerian Court of Appeal decision that tested the constitutionality of Section 24(1) of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015.1 The appellant argued that the provision, which criminalised the transmission of offensive or false information online, violated the constitutional right to freedom of expression.2 The Court of Appeal upheld the provision, rejecting the appellant’s challenge. This case remains a pivotal moment in Nigeria’s cybercrime jurisprudence, reflecting the judiciary’s cautious approach to balancing digital freedom with the need to regulate online speech.
Background
With the enactment of the Cybercrimes Act 2015, Nigeria created its first comprehensive framework to address cyber offences.3 However, Section 24(1), which criminalised “grossly offensive” or “annoying” messages, drew widespread criticism for vagueness and potential abuse.4 Solomon Okedara, a Lagos-based lawyer and activist, directly challenged this section after being charged under it for alleged online comments. His appeal represented one of the first major constitutional tests of the Cybercrimes Act.
Facts
The appellant, Solomon Okedara, was charged under Section 24(1) of the Cybercrimes Act for allegedly transmitting messages considered false and “annoying.” He argued before the Federal High Court that the provision infringed his right to freedom of expression under Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The trial court dismissed his claim, holding that Section 24(1) was a valid law enacted to protect public order and morality. Dissatisfied, Okedara appealed to the Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, challenging both the trial court’s reasoning and the constitutionality of Section 24(1) of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015.
Issues Raised
The key issues before the Court of Appeal were:
Whether Section 24(1) of the Cybercrimes Act 2015 was unconstitutional and violates the right to freedom of expression under Section 39 of the Constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the appellant’s constitutional claim to the clause.
Arguments
Appellant’s arguments
Section 24(1) of the cybercrimes (prohibition, prevention ) Act 2015 was vague and overbroad, making it difficult for citizens to know what conduct was prohibited. Terms like “annoyance,” “ill will,” or “needless anxiety” were subjective and capable of arbitrary enforcement.
The provision imposed an unjustifiable restriction on freedom of expression, which could only be limited under Section 45 of the Constitution.
He urged the Court to adopt comparative jurisprudence, such as Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015), where the Indian Supreme Court struck down a similar provision for vagueness.5
Respondent’s Argument
The Attorney General argued that the Cybercrimes Act was enacted in the interest of public order and morality, both recognised grounds for restricting free speech under Section 45 of the Constitution.6
The wording of Section 24(1) was not ambiguous and could be understood by any reasonable person.
The state had a duty to regulate misuse of online platforms to protect citizens from harassment, false information, and harmful speech.
Judgment / Final Decision
The Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, in a unanimous decision, dismissed the appeal filed by Solomon Okedara and affirmed the validity of Section 24(1) of the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015.
Specifically, the Court held that:
Section 24(1) did not violate Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution (freedom of expression), since the right is not absolute and may be restricted under Section 45 in the interest of public order and morality.
The wording of Section 24(1), though broad, was not unconstitutionally vague, as the terms used could be understood by a reasonable person.
Nigeria’s constitutional context differed from that of India in Shreya Singhal v Union of India, and therefore the Indian precedent was not binding.
The Court therefore dismissed Okedara’s constitutional challenge, upheld his prosecution under the provision, and made no special directions beyond affirming the trial court’s ruling.
LEGAL REASONING/ RATIO DECIDENDI
The Court of Appeal anchored its reasoning on the following
- Freedom of Expression and Its Limits
The appellant contended that Section 24(1), which criminalised the sending of messages considered “grossly offensive, pornographic, indecent, obscene or menacing,” was an overbroad and vague restriction on free speech, thereby unconstitutional. The Court acknowledged that freedom of expression is a fundamental right under Section 39 but emphasized that it is not absolute. Relying on Section 45 of the Constitution, the Court held that the National Assembly may enact laws restricting speech if such limitations are “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society” for the protection of public order, morality, or national security. Thus, the Court reasoned that Section 24(1) fell within the permissible scope of restrictions contemplated by the Constitution.
- Vagueness Challenge
On the issue of vagueness, the appellant argued that expressions such as “annoyance” or “ill will” in Section 24(1) lacked precise legal meaning and were prone to abuse. The Court rejected this, holding that statutory terms must be read in light of their ordinary meaning and the purpose of the legislation. In the Court’s view, a reasonable person could understand what conduct fell within the prohibited acts, and therefore the provision was not void for vagueness. The Court stressed that criminal statutes should not be interpreted mechanically but in a way that advances the object of protecting society from harmful online behavior.
- Comparative Jurisprudence
A key part of the appellant’s argument was the reliance on the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v Union of India, where Section 66A of India’s Information Technology Act 2000 was struck down for being vague and disproportionate. The Nigerian Court of Appeal, however, declined to follow this precedent. It distinguished Nigeria’s constitutional framework from that of India, observing that while comparative decisions are persuasive, they are not binding. The Court noted that Nigeria’s Section 45 expressly permits restrictions on free speech in the interest of public order, and that the social and political context of Nigeria demanded a more cautious approach than the Indian example. Consequently, the Court ruled that Shreya Singhal could not override Nigeria’s domestic constitutional provisions.
- Balancing Rights with Public Interest
The Court further justified its stance by emphasizing the balancing role of the judiciary in safeguarding both rights and societal order. It reasoned that while the freedom of expression is central to democracy, the unchecked spread of offensive or false information online could destabilize society, threaten public peace, and infringe the rights of others. By invoking the doctrine of constitutional proportionality, the Court concluded that Section 24(1) represented a proportionate response to legitimate public concerns in Nigeria’s digital age.
- Deference to Legislative Judgment
Finally, the Court underscored the principle of judicial deference to the legislature in policy matters, particularly in emerging fields like cybercrime regulation. It held that questions about whether Section 24(1) should be narrowed or redrafted were best left to lawmakers, not judges. This reasoning signaled the Court’s reluctance to substitute its own policy preferences for those of the elected branches of government.
Obiter Dicta
While upholding Section 24(1), the Court nevertheless observed that the provision’s breadth could invite misuse if not carefully applied. The Justices hinted that legislative clarification might, in the future, be desirable to prevent its use against legitimate expression. They also remarked that Nigeria, like other democracies, may in time need to adopt a more expansive human rights approach as its jurisprudence evolves. Finally, the Court reiterated that freedom of expression “carries duties and responsibilities,” echoing global human rights instruments such as Article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).7
Conclusion/observation
The decision in Okedara v Attorney General of the Federation represents a defining moment in Nigeria’s cybercrime jurisprudence. By upholding Section 24(1) of the Cybercrimes Act, the Court of Appeal affirmed the State’s power to regulate online expression in the interest of public order and security. At the same time, the judgment reflects the judiciary’s cautious approach in balancing individual freedoms with collective societal concerns in the digital age.
However, the case also leaves unresolved tensions. While the Court rejected the vagueness challenge, critics argue that terms like “annoyance” and “ill will” remain open to subjective interpretation, raising the risk of misuse against journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens. The obiter remarks suggesting possible legislative clarification highlight that even the judiciary recognizes these potential pitfalls.
From a broader perspective, this case illustrates the growing struggle in Nigeria, as elsewhere, to reconcile the right to free expression with the responsibility to combat harmful online conduct. As digital communication continues to expand, the judgment underscores the urgent need for legislative refinement, judicial sensitivity, and stronger institutional safeguards to ensure that cybercrime laws protect society without stifling dissent.
In my view, the Okedara case is significant not only for its outcome but also for the questions it leaves behind. It challenges lawmakers, judges, and civil society to engage more deeply with the intersection of human rights and technology a task that will undoubtedly shape Nigeria’s democratic and digital future.
SOURCES
Solomon Okedara v Attorney General of the Federation (CA/L/174/18, Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, 28 February 2019) Certified True Copy of Judgment.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015 (as amended by the Cybercrimes (Amendment) Act 2024).
Evidence Act 2011 (as amended).
Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, art 19(3). The Nigeria Lawyer, ‘Court of Appeal Upholds Cybercrimes Act Section 24 in Okedara v AGF’ (2019) https://thenigerialawyer.com accessed 28 August 2025.
Premium Times, ‘ECOWAS Court Declares Section 24 of Cybercrimes Act Incompatible with Freedom of Expression’ (2024) https://www.premiumtimesng.com accessed 28 August 2025.
SERAP, ‘SERAP v Nigeria: Freedom of Expression and Section 24 Cybercrimes Act’ (ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/24, 2024) https://serap-nigeria.org accessed 28 August 2025. Daily Trust, ‘Journalists Still Face Arrests under Cybercrimes Act despite Amendment’ (2024) https://dailytrust.com accessed 28 August 2025.
Reference(S):
1 Solomon Okedara v Attorney General of the Federation (CA/L/174/18, Court of Appeal, Lagos Division, 28 February 2019).
2 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 39.
3 Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015.
4 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Cybercrime law being used to silence critics’ (2019).
5 Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
6 Constitution (1999) as amended, ss 39, 45.
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, art 19(3)
