SUNNY ANG v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1966] 2 MLJ 195 

Case Title & Citation 

• SUNNY ANG v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1966] 2 MLJ 195 

Court Name 

• Malaysian Federal Court 
• TAN AH TAH AGCJ, CHUA AND WINSLOW JJ

Date of Judgment 

• 19 November 1965 

Parties Involved 

Sunny Ang Soo Suan came from a middle-class background and was known for his flamboyant personality. He was not only an accomplished scuba diver but also a race-car driver, having achieved a top-ten finish in the first Singapore Grand Prix in 1961. However, his attempts to build a stable career were less successful. He failed to complete both a teacher training programme and a pilot training course. At the same time, he pursued part-time law studies with aspirations of furthering his education in England. In 1962, Ang was declared bankrupt after being unable to settle a judgment debt of approximately $2,000. 

Jenny Cheok Cheng Kid, on the other hand, worked as a waitress at the Odeon Bar and Restaurant, where she earned a modest salary of $90 a month along with an additional $10 a day in tips. She was separated from her husband and was the mother of two young children who remained in the care of their father. Ang met Jenny in mid-1963, and soon after, the two began a romantic relationship. 

Facts of the Case 

On 18 May 1965, the appellant, Sunny Ang, was convicted of the murder of Jenny Cheok Cheng Kid, a 22-year-old bar waitress, and sentenced to death. He subsequently appealed against the conviction. According to the prosecution, the offence took place on 27 August 1963 at about 5 p.m. at sea, near two islands known as Pulau Dua (the Sisters’ Islands). That afternoon, the appellant had hired a boatman, Yusof, to take both himself and Jenny to the waters between the islands, ostensibly to collect corals. While Ang claimed that coral collection was his true intention, the prosecution contended that his real purpose was to murder Jenny. 

Jenny was an inexperienced scuba diver, but the appellant assisted her in putting on diving equipment and allowed her to dive alone into hazardous waters. He remained in the boat even after Jenny failed to resurface. Subsequent evidence revealed that one of Jenny’s flippers, later recovered, had been deliberately cut, which would have caused her to lose balance and panic underwater. 

The prosecution’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. At the time of the incident, the appellant was bankrupt and in desperate need of money. Jenny was heavily insured, with accident policies amounting to $450,000, several of which named the appellant’s mother as the beneficiary. Notably, one policy worth $150,000 had lapsed the day before Jenny’s disappearance but was renewed by the appellant on the very morning of 27 August 1963. Another policy, worth $100,000, was due to expire the following day. Jenny had also executed a will earlier that month, naming the appellant’s mother as sole beneficiary, with Ang present when instructions were given to the solicitor. 

Jenny had limited diving experience, and expert testimony confirmed that it was unsafe for a novice to dive alone in the dangerous waters near Pulau Dua. Despite this, the appellant not only allowed her to go down alone but also failed to act with urgency when she did not resurface. Further suspicion arose when the pair of gloves brought by the appellant remained unused in his swimming bag, suggesting that coral collection was never his real purpose. 

Less than 24 hours after Jenny’s disappearance, the appellant lodged formal claims on three of her accident insurance policies. The cumulative circumstances which includes his financial motive, the suspicious timing of the insurance renewals, Jenny’s will, the dangerous dive

conditions, the cut flipper, and his conduct during and after the incident has formed the basis of the prosecution’s case against him. 

Issues Raised 

• Whether the conviction could stand when the evidence was wholly circumstantial and no body was found 

Arguments of the Parties 

Counsel for the appellant contended that the conviction was unsafe as it rested wholly on circumstantial evidence, without direct proof that the appellant had caused Jenny’s death. The absence of the body meant that the cause of death remained unproven, leaving open reasonable possibilities such as accidental drowning, natural causes, or voluntary disappearance. The alleged sabotage of the flipper strap was speculative, since no witness testified that the appellant had cut it. Furthermore, it was argued that the learned trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury on the possibility of a lesser verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, as the circumstances might have indicated recklessness or negligence rather than an intention to kill. The appellant also submitted that the prosecution abused section 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code by calling witnesses at trial without adequate notice, thereby depriving the defence of a fair opportunity to prepare. In addition, the admission of evidence relating to attempts to suborn the witness Yusof was prejudicial, as no one had in fact asked him to alter his story and such evidence could only have inflamed the jury against the accused. It was further alleged that the trial judge showed bias by casting aspersions on defence counsel’s conduct and by misstating certain aspects of the evidence in the summing-up, thereby prejudicing the appellant’s case. Finally, it was argued that the trial judge failed to adequately warn the jury of the dangers of convicting solely on circumstantial evidence, since they ought to have been told in stronger terms that unless the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, the appellant was entitled to an acquittal. 

For the prosecution, it was argued that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed cumulatively, was overwhelming and pointed irresistibly to the appellant’s guilt. The appellant’s financial difficulties, Jenny’s unusually extensive insurance coverage, the suspicious renewal of her policies on the morning of the incident, her will naming the appellant’s mother as sole beneficiary, her inexperience as a diver, the dangerous waters at Pulau Dua, the sabotage of the flipper strap, the appellant’s failure to rescue her, and his immediate filing of insurance claims together formed a complete chain of evidence consistent only with murder. The prosecution further submitted that this was not a case of negligence but of calculated planning, and thus the jury was only entitled to return a verdict of murder or no offence at all; a direction on culpable homicide was unnecessary. On the procedural points, it was contended that there was no breach of section 192(3) CPC since no time limit was prescribed and the defence was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. As for Yusof’s evidence, it was admissible and not prejudicial, particularly since the defence counsel himself wished to have it recorded in order to explain his conduct. The trial judge was not biased; he had accepted counsel’s explanation and repeatedly reminded the jury that they were the sole judges of fact. Finally, the directions on circumstantial evidence were adequate, as the jury was properly instructed to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence and to acquit if there was any other reasonable explanation, such as an accident. 

Judgment / Final Decision 

The Federal Court dismissed Sunny Ang’s appeal and upheld his conviction and sentence of death for the murder of Jenny Cheok. The court held that although the prosecution’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence and Jenny’s body was never recovered, the totality of the facts proved formed a complete and unbroken chain that led irresistibly to the conclusion that the appellant had intentionally caused her death. The Federal Court observed that factors such as the appellant’s dire financial situation, his knowledge of Jenny’s extensive insurance policies, the suspicious renewal of her coverage on the morning of the incident, the will naming his mother as beneficiary, Jenny’s inexperience in diving, the hazardous location, the deliberate sabotage of her flipper strap, the appellant’s failure to attempt rescue, and his swift pursuit of insurance claims after her disappearance collectively excluded all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. 

The court rejected the defence’s submission that the trial judge had erred by not leaving culpable homicide not amounting to murder to the jury, holding that on the facts the appellant was either guilty of murder or of no offence at all. Allegations of procedural unfairness and judicial bias were also dismissed. The Federal Court held that the prosecution had properly exercised its rights under section 192(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, that the admission of evidence regarding interference with witnesses was not prejudicial, and that the judge’s summing-up gave sufficient warning to the jury about the dangers of convicting solely on circumstantial evidence. Ultimately, the court ruled that the circumstantial evidence, although indirect, was overwhelming and proved beyond reasonable doubt that Sunny Ang murdered Jenny. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction and death sentence were affirmed 

Legal Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi 

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a conviction for murder can rest entirely on circumstantial evidence, even in the absence of the victim’s body, so long as the evidence forms a complete and unbroken chain that leads irresistibly to the guilt of the accused. The court held that circumstantial evidence must not be considered piece by piece in isolation, but in its cumulative effect. If, when taken together, the circumstances exclude any other reasonable explanation such as accident, misadventure, or natural causes, the jury is entitled to draw the inference that the accused committed the crime. In this case, the appellant’s financial difficulties, Jenny’s unusual insurance coverage, the renewal of her policy on the very morning of the incident, her will naming the appellant’s mother as sole beneficiary, the hazardous diving conditions, the sabotage of her flipper strap, and the appellant’s conduct both during and after her disappearance, all combined to create an overwhelming inference of guilt that could not reasonably be explained otherwise.

The legal principle established is that circumstantial evidence is not inferior to direct evidence; if it is cogent, consistent, and points irresistibly to the accused, it is sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The case demonstrates that the absence of a body does not prevent a conviction for murder where the surrounding circumstances eliminate any reasonable alternative explanation. Additionally, the court clarified that where the proven facts support either murder or no offence at all, it is not necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury on lesser alternative offences such as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. This principle has since guided Malaysian and Singaporean courts in treating circumstantial evidence with equal weight to direct testimony, provided that the inference of guilt is the only logical conclusion from the totality of the evidence. 

Conclusion / Observations 

In conclusion, Sunny Ang v Public Prosecutor [1966] 2 MLJ 195 firmly established the principle that a conviction for murder, even one carrying the death penalty, does not require direct evidence or the recovery of the victim’s body. What is crucial is that the circumstantial evidence must form a complete, consistent, and unbroken chain that points irresistibly to the accused’s guilt while excluding any other reasonable hypothesis. The Federal Court’s decision underscored that circumstantial evidence is not inferior to direct testimony; when properly linked and assessed as a whole, it can be equally, if not more, persuasive in proving criminal liability. 

This case has become a landmark in Malaysian and Singaporean criminal jurisprudence, often cited to illustrate that the absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of guilt where the circumstances speak with compelling clarity. Subsequent cases, particularly those involving circumstantial proof of murder or serious offences, have drawn on Sunny Ang to reinforce the proposition that the court must look at the cumulative effect of the evidence rather than treating each fact in isolation. By affirming the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to sustain a capital conviction, the court provided future judges with a framework to evaluate such cases while ensuring that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt remains uncompromised. 

Reference(s)

Case Citation 

• Sunny Ang v Public Prosecutor [1966] 2 MLJ 195 (Fed Ct, Malaysia). 

Secondary Source (Newsletter Article) 

• Skrine, ‘Body of Evidence’ (Skrine, September 2012) https://www.skrine.com/insights/newsletter/september-2012/body-of-evidence accessed 31 August 2025.