Authored By: Abel Tulu
Addis Ababa University
Case Title
Tehras Fisehay Vs Zenebech Berihun, Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia Cassation Division, File no. 43821 (January 13, 2010) Cassation decision Vol. 9
Official Citation
Tirhas Fisehaye Vs Zenebech Berihun Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia Cassation Division, File no. 43821 (January 13, 2010) Cassation decision Vol. 9 https://lawethiopia.com/images/cassation/cassation%20decisions%20by%20number/volume%209/43821.pdf
Court Name: The Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia, Cassation Division Bench.
Date of Judgment: January 13, 2010.
Parties Involved
Applicant: Tirhas Fisehaye
Respondent: Zenebech Berihun
Cover Note
This case summary was prepared as a part of my legal research portfolio. It analyzes the decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia in Tirhas Fisehaye Vs Zenebech Berihun case focusing on Review of Judgment under the civil procedure code of Ethiopia. The summary demonstrates my particular interest in civil litigation, while the concluding reflection represents an objective analysis that is based solely on my own perspective.
Facts of the case
The plaintiff, W/o Zenebech Berihun, sought to establish the paternity of two children, but the Arsi Zone First Instance court ruled in favor of the defendant, W/o Tirhas Fisehaye, based on submitted evidence. Dissatisfied, the current applicant challenged the decision before the cassation bench of the Federal Supreme Court on the merit of establishing the paternity. Nonetheless, she did not succeed. Later on, she sought a review of judgment before the court of rendition as per Art. 6 of the civil Procedure code alleging that she discovered new evidence which would meet the criteria of the article under discussion. Despite this, the court of rendition rejected her application saying that she lodged appeal and then she file application to cassation in which case review of judgment is not permissible as provided under Art.6(1). After that she lodged appeal to the regional Supreme Court. However, the appellate court confirmed the decision of the lower court. Her cassation application was also not accepted by the Oromia regional cassation bench. She then filed a cassation appeal on the basis of basic error of law as per article 80(3)(A) of the FDRE constitution and article 6 of the civil procedure code of Ethiopia, arguing that new evidence warranted re-examination. The defendant opposed, claiming the matter was conclusively decided. The Cassation Bench reviewed whether the appeal met legal criteria for re-examination, assessing the validity of the new evidence and its potential to overturn the prior judgment. The court scrutinized procedural fairness, the interpretation of Article 6, and the balance between finality of judgments and justice.
Issues Raised
The main issues in this case revolve around whether the plaintiff’s cassation appeal under Article 6 of the civil procedure code is admissible, particularly in light of new evidence challenging the original judgment’s reliance on allegedly false testimony; whether the lower courts’ repeated dismissals were procedurally sound; and how to balance the principle of finality in judicial decisions with the pursuit of justice when new facts emerge. Additionally, the case examines the proper interpretation of Article 6 of the civil procedure code regarding re-examination of cases involving fraudulent evidence, the role of the Cassation Bench in rectifying fundamental judicial errors, and the broader legal implications of reopening a settled matter based on newly discovered proof.
Arguments of the Parties
The plaintiff (W/o Zenebech Berihun) argued that the original judgment against her was founded on evidence she contends was false and fabricated by the defendant. She asserts that she has since acquired new and genuine evidence which conclusively proves her claim and invalidates the basis of the initial ruling. This discovery, she argues, provides the necessary grounds for a cassation appeal under Article 6 of the civil procedure code, specifically sub-articles (1)(a), which permit re-examination when a verdict rests on fraudulent evidence or when such fraud would have justified a different outcome. Her primary objective is to secure a re-examination of the entire case based on this new evidence, which she is confident will lead to the overturning of the previous decision. She further maintains that the lower courts committed a fundamental error of law by dismissing her appeals without giving due consideration to the substantive merits and implications of her newly discovered proof.
On the other hand the Defendant (W/o Tirhas Fisehaye) argued that the principle of finality of judgment, asserting that the matter has been conclusively settled by the competent courts and the decision has become legally binding. She contends that the plaintiff’s attempt to have the case re-examined on its merits is procedurally inadmissible, as the legal avenues for appeal have been fully exhausted. The defendant relies on a specific legal interpretation of Article 6, citing a prior cassation decision (File No. 16624), to argue that a request for re-examination must be made before a judgment becomes final, not after the fact. From her perspective, the plaintiff is misapplying the provision of Article 6 in an improper attempt to re-litigate a case that has already been lost. The defendant also challenges the credibility and substance of the plaintiff’s so-called new evidence, arguing it is insufficient to justify the extraordinary measure of nullifying a final and executed verdict.
Final Decision of the court (Judgment)
The Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench accepted her application and ruled in favor of the plaintiff, overturning the previous decisions of the lower courts and nullifying the prior legal interpretation of Article 6, and instead accepting the plaintiff’s petition for a re-examination of the case under Article 6 of the civil procedure code, thereby remanding the case to the Arsi Zona First Instance Court ordered the trial court to accept the appeal, and examine whether review is acceptable or not and hear the defendant’s response, and render a new decision, while also ordering each party to bear their own costs from this cassation proceeding.
Legal Reasoning of the Court
The court’s reasoning centered on a fundamental reinterpretation of Article 6 of the civil procedure code. The Bench reasoned that despite the fact that Art. 6 seems to prohibit review after appeal is lodged, when we see the context of the Civil Procedure Code, we can realize that review of judgment by the court of rendition is not prohibited even if appeal is lodged on the merit of the case. The primary objective was to reconcile the procedural finality of judgments with the overarching judicial imperative to uncover the substantive truth and correct fundamental errors. The Bench reasoned that the core purpose of Article 6 is to serve as a corrective mechanism for instances where a final judgment is rendered based on fraudulent or false evidence, as stipulated in sub-articles 1(a) and (c). The court held that adhering to a strict, literal interpretation that only allows appeals before a judgment becomes final would defeat the very essence of this provision. Such an interpretation would permanently entrench injustices born from fraud, rendering the court’s truth-seeking function obsolete.
Therefore, the Bench explicitly overturned its previous precedent set in Cassation File No. 16624, which had endorsed that restrictive view. The new ruling establishes that a request for re-examination can be admissible even after a judgment is final, provided the applicant meets the high threshold of proving that the original decision was fundamentally predicated on false evidence. This reasoning prioritizes substantive justice; ensuring decisions are based on truth over a rigid application of procedural finality. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s new evidence alleging fraud met this threshold, thus warranting a re-examination of the entire case on its merits by the lower court.
Conclusion (Reflection)
The decision, in my opinion, is untenable since only vague or ambiguous laws require legal interpretation. Article 6 of the civil procedure code of the empire of Ethiopia reads as “Notwithstanding the provisions of Art. 5, any party considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal lies, but from which no appeal has been preferred, or by a decree or order from which no appeal lies, may, on payment of the prescribed court fee, apply for a review of judgment to the court. ” The statute made it quite clear that if an appeal has been filed, a party that feels wronged cannot request a review of the judgment. When creating a statute, the Court should follow the golden rule and interpret the words in their ordinary sense. Additionally, the civil code said that “the court may not depart from a contract’s provisions and determine the parties’ intentions by way of interpretation when such provisions are clear.” It is clear from these two viewpoints that a clear law should be enforced literally, devoid of interpretation.
The civil procedure code’s pursuit of truth as one of its objectives served as the foundation for the cassation bench’s reasoning in determining its decisions. It was said that while one of the legislators’ objectives is to discover the truth, they also want a speedy trial that is economical with regard to both money and time. Thus, it would be appropriate if the court arrived at a compromise between these code goals. Legislative bodies are acknowledged as having the power to establish laws, and the cassation bench of the federal Supreme Court is empowered to interpret them. In interpreting these statutes, the court is going beyond its bounds of jurisdiction and taking the place of the legislative.
In conclusion, the cassation bench of the federal Supreme Court is unworkable for two main reasons. First of all, Article 6 of the Civil Procedure is clear and concise, leaving no room for interpretation. Interpreting a clearly defined clause would be absurd, and it would give the court the power to make laws which is beyond its authority. Second, the legislature’s intention and all of the goals of the legislation, rather than just one (seeking the truth), should be considered by the court if interpretation is necessary.
