S.R. BOMMAI V. UNION OF INDIA 1994 AIR 1918, 1994 SCC (3)

Supreme Court of India

Bench: Kuldip Singh, P.B. Sawant, K. Ramaswamy, S.C. Agrawal, Yogeshwar  Dayal, B.P. Jeevan Reddy, S.R. Pandian, A.M. Ahmadi

Date of Judgment: March 11, 1994

Parties Involved

Petitioners: S.R. Bommai (former Chief Minister of Karnataka), leaders from  other State governments (Nagaland, Meghalaya, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan,  Himachal Pradesh), affected by proclamations of President’s Rule.

Respondent: Union of India

FACTS OF THE CASE

• During 1988–1992, the Union Government frequently invoked Article 356 of the Indian Constitution (President’s Rule) to dismiss non-Congress State governments, including the Bommai government in Karnataka and others. The proclamations stated that State  governments could not be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The validity of  these proclamations was questioned, especially amid allegations that Article 356 was being  misused for political gain rather than genuine constitutional crises. The Supreme Court was  asked to determine the constitutional limits, justiciability, and meaning of Article 356, amid  the backdrop of challenges from Karnataka, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Madhya Pradesh,  Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh.
• The case arose out of the dismissal of multiple sate governments and the imposition of President’s Rule under A.356 of the Indian Constitution. The states affected included Karnataka, Meghalaya, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and others.
• Article 356 allows the President of India to take over a state’s administration if there is a failure of constitutional machinery, as reported by the Governor or based on other relevant material facts available or presented.
• The Petitioner, including political leaders and former Chief Ministers, contended that the dismissal of their governments was politically motivated and lack sufficient justification under A. 356.
• It was alleged that Governors acted arbitrarily, often under the influence of the Central Government, recommending the dissolution of state legislatures without genuine evidence of a constitutional breakdown.
• Historical instances showed a pattern where A. 356 has been used excessively since Independence, often to dismiss state governments led by opposition parties. This raised concerns about the misuse of the provisions for political gains.
• The key question before the court was whether the imposition of President’s Rule in these instances was valid and if the satisfaction of the President under A.356 could be subject to judicial review.

LEGAL ISSUES

• Is the President’s “satisfaction” under Article 356 justiciable and open to judicial review? • What is the permissible scope of judicial review regarding Presidential Proclamations under Article 356?
• Is a floor test in the legislative assembly mandatory before dismissal on the grounds of loss of majority?
• Does the imposition of President’s Rule violate the federal structure of the Constitution, a basic feature protected from legislative amendments?
• What role does the Governor play in the recommendation of President’s Rule, and how impartial must this role be?

CONTENTIONS

ARGUMENTS BY PETITIONER

1. The petitioners argued that the frequent and arbitrary invocation of Article 356 undermined the autonomy off states and disrupted the federal balance envisioned in the Constitution. 2. They contended that the satisfaction off the President, though discretionary, could not be immune from judicial scrutiny particularly if it was based on irrelevant, non-existent, or  malafide grounds.
2. It was pointed out that Governors had often acted in a partisan manner, recommending President’s Rule without proper evidence or consultation with the state governments. 4. The petitioners highlighted specific instances, such as in Karnataka and Meghalaya, where governments were dismissed despite enjoying majority support in the legislature,  demonstrating a lack of constitutional justification.
3. They also raised concerns that the dissolution of state assemblies and the dismissal of elected governments were used as tools to destabilize political opponents.

ARGUMENTS BY THE RESPONDENTS

1. The respondents, representing the Union of India, defended the proclamations under Article 356, asserting that they were based on legitimate concerns regarding the failure off constitutional machinery in the respective states.
2. At was argued that the President’s satisfaction was formed on the advice of the Council of Ministers and reports from Governors, which were deemed reliable sources of information 3. They maintained that judicial review of such proclamations would interfere with the separation of powers and the discretion granted to the President under the Constitution. 4. The respondents also emphasized that all proclamations issued under Article 356 required  Parliamentary approval, serving as a check on arbitrary executive action.
3. They contended that the Central Government acted only in cases of genuine breakdown in governance and that these interventions were essential to uphold constitutional principles.

JUDGMENT/DECISION BY SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

• The Supreme Court rules that proclamations issued under A.356 are subject to judicial review, ensuring that they are not based on irrelevant, insufficient, or malafide grounds. • The court emphasized that federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution, and the misuse of A.356 undermines the democratic and federal structure, that would mean to be a threat  to the basic structure.

• The court outlined clear principles for the application for A.356, President’s Rule can only be invoked in cases of genuine constitutional breakdown, and its use must be a last resort. • The role of the Governor must be impartial, and their recommendations should be based on concrete evidence of failure of governance.
• The dissolution of a state legislature should not be automatic and should follow a rigorous assessment of alternative measures.
• Secularism is part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Any acts by State governments to subvert secularism can constitute grounds for President’s Rule, but this must be demonstrable, objective, and subject to judicial review.
• The Governor’s role is circumscribed if majority support is doubtful, the Governor must order a floor test the assembly itself must determine who commands its confidence. • The President should ordinarily not dissolve the state assembly until the Proclamation is approved by both Houses of Parliament. If the Court strikes down the Proclamation, it has  the authority to restore the original status quo

LEGAL REASONING / RATIO DECIDENDI

Scope of Judicial Review: The President’s subjective satisfaction is justiciable only to a limited  extent: courts can review whether relevant and objective material existed, whether irrelevant or  extraneous factors were considered, or whether mala fides or arbitrariness was present.

Floor Test Principle: The correct constitutional procedure for testing the majority of a State  government is a floor test. Subjective assessments by the Governor or President without this are  unconstitutional. A floor test is a constitutional used in parliament to determine whether the  government in power still has the support referred to as the “confidence” of the majority of the  members.

Federal Structure: Article 356 is an emergency measure; excessive resort to President’s Rule  undermines Indian federalism and wounds democracy.

Secularism: Any governmental attempts to undermine the principle of secularism justify federal  intervention, but not mere differences in religious policies; there must be objective proof of a  breach of secularism.

Remedies: If the proclamation is found invalid, the judiciary has the power to restore the previous  situation (status quo ante), even restoring the ministry and legislature.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s judgment in S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India stands as a monumental pillar  in India’s constitutional jurisprudence, reaffirming the foundational values of federalism,  democracy, secularism, and the rule of law. It decisively curtailed the arbitrary and politically  motivated misuse of Article 356 of the Constitution a provision often invoked by the Centre to  dismiss State governments by insisting on clear, objective grounds and judicial oversight.

This ruling established that the President’s power to proclaim President’s Rule is not unfettered or  immune from judicial scrutiny; instead, it is subject to meaningful review by the judiciary to ensure  that it is exercised only in genuine constitutional crises. The Court made it clear that political  disagreements, loss of popularity of a ruling party at the Centre, or even allegations of  maladministration do not justify dismissal of a State government. Instead, there must be credible  and objective material indicating that the State government has failed to comply with constitutional  norms.

A vital outcome of the judgment is the constitutionalization of the floor test as the exclusive and indispensable tool to determine the majority of a Council of Ministers. This ensures that political  majorities are ascertained transparently on the Assembly floor, thereby preventing Governors or  the Centre from depending on subjective or partisan assessments to dismiss elected governments.  By mandating a floor test, the Court safeguarded the democratic legitimacy of State governments  and strengthened legislative supremacy.

Furthermore, the Court’s declaration that secularism is part of the “basic structure” of the  Constitution introduced a crucial normative yardstick. State governments that undertake acts  subverting secularism potentially invite constitutional intervention, but such intervention must  always be backed by objective proof and is subject to judicial review—thus balancing the need for  federal checks with protection of political freedoms within States.

The judgment also empowered the judiciary with remedial authority to restore dismissed  governments and dissolved assemblies if the proclamation is found unconstitutional, thereby  providing a tangible remedy for wrongful use of Article 356. This aspect emphasized the  judiciary’s role as a protector of the democratic process and constitutional balance.

Overall, the Bommai judgment reinforced India’s federal character by strongly discouraging the  Centre from interfering in State politics capriciously or for political expediency. It institutionalized  judicial safeguards that protect both the autonomy of States and the fundamental democratic  principle that governments derive their legitimacy from the elected legislature’s confidence.

In essence, S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India is not just a precedent on Article 356; it is a  constitutional landmark that balances Centre-State relations with democratic accountability and  constitutional morality. It acts as a bulwark against authoritarian overreach, safeguards secularism  as a cornerstone of national unity, and fortifies the spirit of cooperative federalism in India’s  constitutional democracy.