Authored By: Yeabsira Gezahegn
Addis Ababa University
Case Name: Harari Regional Public Prosecutor v. Bona Ahmed Amin, Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court Cassation bench, File No. 46412 Volume 12
Judges: Hagos Woldu, Teshager G/silase, Berihanu Amenew, Almaw Wole, Ali Mohammed
The case of Harari Regional Public Prosecutor v. Bona Ahmed Amin, Cassation File No. 46412 Volume 12, decided after the petition filed on May 06, 2009 or Miyaziya 28, 2001 E.C., is a landmark ruling on the interpretation of Article 626 of the Ethiopian Criminal Code concerning sexual intercourse with minors between the ages of thirteen and eighteen. The case arose when a sixteen year old defendant was accused of committing forced sexual intercourse with a fifteen year old girl, leading to his acquittal by the trial and appellate courts on the ground that the law did not clearly criminalize such conduct between juveniles. On additional appeal, the Cassation Bench inspected if the lower court’s ruling had a fundamental mistake of law in employing Articles 620 626, 56, and 211 of the Criminal Code, and if minors between thirteen and eighteen would be deemed protected under the law. In this article, I will demonstrate the background of the case, the legal issues raised, the reasoning of the court, and why the Cassation Bench’s decision brings significant insinuations for protecting children from sexual abuse in Ethiopia.
Background of the Case
The case arose in the Harari Regional State plus involves the crime of sexual assault carried out against a minor girl. On Hedar 07, 2000 E.C. (November 17, 2007), at around 10:00 PM, in the area of Nide Gobe, Kebele 19, Harar, the respondent was alleged of getting into the house of a 15 year old girl, Zemu Ahmed, closed and locked the door, cut the lights, and committing the act of sexual intercourse with her in contradiction of her capability to resist and against her will. The prosecution accused him under Article 620 of the 1996 Criminal Code, which bans sexual assault.
When the accusation was recited, the respondent originally specified he had no opposition to the charge but subsequently repudiated the claims. The prosecutor exhibited in cooperation physical and document indication to show the crime. Nonetheless, the Harari District Court exonerated the respondent under Article 141 of the Criminal Procedure Code, justifying that the sexual intercourse had happened deprived of force and with the supposed consent of the girl.
The public prosecutor, disgruntled with the exoneration, appealed to the Harari Supreme Court. The court acknowledged the evidence that sexual intercourse had certainly happened, but it upheld the vindication. The court found that the act did not fall under Article 620, since both the accused (16 years old) and the girl (15 years old) were both under 18. It apprehended that the law did not evidently furnish for such conditions and disallowed the request. The Appeals Court consequently supported the lower court’s ruling and established the vindication.
On Miyaziya 28, 2001 E.C. (May 6, 2009), the prosecutor submitted an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench, calming that the lower courts had done a fundamental legal error. The appeal highlighted that the judgments neglected to properly enforce the spirit and phrasing of Articles 2(3), 56, 211, 620 and 626 of the Criminal Code. Article 626(1), which forbids sexual intercourse with children between the ages of 13 and 18, must have been applied and that the respondent’s vindication was conflicting to the shielding feature of the law.
The respondent, defended by counsel, filed his written reply on Megabit 14, 2002 E.C. (March 23, 2010), contending that the prosecution had not adequately demonstrated that sexual intercourse happened. Though, the Cassation Bench, relying on Article 80(3)(a) of the FDRE Constitution and Proclamation No. 25/1988, detained that it needed jurisdiction to review the accurate findings of the lower courts. Consequently, it acknowledged as recognized fact that the respondent, then aged 16, had sexual intercourse with the 15 year old girl.
Issues Raised
The major issue brought up was whether or not the lower courts misjudged in vindicating the defendant on the foundation that the girl or victim, even though only fifteen years old, had given consented to the sexual intercourse the took place. This raised the bigger legal problem of whether or not consent by a minor between thirteen and eighteen can ever be recognized as valid under Article 626(1) of the Criminal Code.
The next issue was whether or not the defendant’s behavior obviously established the crime under Article 626(1) and 620, which criminalizes sexual intercourse with any minor above the age of thirteen but below eighteen, regardless of the attendance or absence of consent.
An additional issue was whether or not the trial and appellate courts miscarried to give proper effect to Articles 56 and 211 of the Criminal Code, which deliver the rules on juvenile liability and capacity for criminal responsibility, and which clarify that offenders above the age of fifteen are generally not exempt from liability.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner (Prosecutor):
The Prosecutor claimed that the lower courts, had misapplied law in vindicating the defendant. The foremost argument was that the courts inappropriately took the underage victim’s consent as a lawful justification, notwithstanding the fact that she was only fifteen years old at the time of the sexual assault. The Prosecutor highlighted that Article 626(1) of the Criminal Code openly bans sexual intercourse with minors aged amongst thirteen and eighteen, and consequently, consent of a minor cannot legally justify the offender. The act should fall under Article 620 of the criminal code.
It was more argued that the courts overlooked the protective purpose of the Criminal Code, which targets to defend children from sexual abuse. The Criminal Code which address the code of legality was out-of-place, since the provisions of Article 626 clearly dealt with the circumstances and recognized criminal liability for acts done in contradiction of minors, irrespective of consent.
Respondent (Defendant):
The defendant, through his advocate, contended that there was no evidence that the sexual intercourse had been by force without the girl’s consent . He opposed that the prosecution’s case depend on circumstantial evidence and that the testimonies presented were lacking to create guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The respondent’s lawyer additionally contended that the defendant, being sixteen years old at the time, was not criminally accountable under Article 626(1) of the Criminal Code, which they understood to provide protections for juvenile criminals engaging in sexual activity with peers aged thirteen to eighteen. The defense upheld that the act did not establish as rape under Article 620, because there was no use of force, and they highlighted that the victim supposedly gave consent to the act. In spirit, the defense depended on the defendant’s age, the victim’s age, and the consent quarrel to claim exemption from criminal liability.
Final Decision / Judgment
The Supreme Court heard the case and determined that the respondent’s acquittal by the lower courts was essentially defective in law. The Court observed that it was obviously established from the records that the respondent had indeed sexual intercourse with a fifteen year old girl, which both lower courts had acknowledged. Nonetheless, the lower courts incorrectly depended on the argument that the act was consensual and that the defendant’s age excused him from criminal obligation, which the Supreme Court found to be inappropriate in this circumstance.
The Supreme Court explained that the defendant, being sixteen years old at the time of the incident, cannot escape liability simply for the victim was fifteen years old or for the reason of misconceptions of age of consent provisions. It emphasized that Articles 56, 211, and 626(1) of the Criminal Code were unswervingly valid. Precisely, Article 626(1) offers rules regarding sexual dealings concerning minors, and the Court stressed that the law intentions to protect children and adolescents from sexual abuse, irrespective of apparent consent between parties close in age. Assumed these answers, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts had disregarded both the letter and the spirit of the Criminal Code in reaching their decisions. Consequently, under Article 195(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the lower courts in its entirety. The case was remanded to the Harari District Court, guiding the lower court to correctly reflect the prosecution evidence, afford the respondent the opportunity to present a defense, and issue a judgment reliable with Articles 56, 211, and 626(1) of the Criminal Code.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts erred in acquitting the respondent. Although the respondent was sixteen and the victim fifteen, the law under Articles 56, 211, and 626(1) of the Criminal Code clearly establishes that sexual acts involving minors are punishable, regardless of whether the minor appears to have consented. The court stressed that the legal safeguards for children are envisioned to protect them from abuses and unfitting sexual conduct. Also, the Court explained that orientations to age of consent provisions or juvenile immunities cannot be misunderstood to release a person of criminal responsibility when the act includes coercion, confinement, or manipulation, as in this case where the victim was locked in a room and her mouth covered. Based on these deliberations, the Supreme Court found that the vindication was an essential error of law and remanded the case to the lower courts to deliver a judgment reliable with the law and the rights of the minor.
Broader Significance
This case emphasizes the Ethiopian judiciary’s steadfast attitude on protecting minors from sexual exploitation, strengthening those legal protections implements irrespective of apparent consent between youths. It explains the limits of the age of consent laws and underlines the responsibility of the courts to interpret criminal law in a way that highlights the safety and welfare of children. Outside the immediate case, it sets a significant example, safeguarding that similar cases of sexual assault in contradiction of minors are judged with due respect to statutory protections, thus firming the enforcement of laws designed to battle the abuse of children.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s governing in this case underlines the significance of guarding minors from sexual abuse and elucidates the application of the Criminal Code concerning crimes relating to children. By knocking over the lower courts’ judgment to exonerate the plaintiff, the Court confirmed that age and claimed consent cannot armor an individual from accountability when sexual intercourse happens with a minor under the law. The ruling highlights severe devotion to legal provisions, particularly Articles 56, 211, and 626(1) of the Criminal Code, and strengthens the attitude that the best welfares and protection of children must lead judicial interpretation. This judgment arrays a significant model for upcoming cases.
Reference(S):
- Ethiopian criminal code Articles, 620, 626(1), 211(1), 2(3) ,141, 56
- FDRE Constitution, Article 80(3)(a)
- Criminal Procedure Code 195(2)(a)
- Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court Cassation bench, File No. 46412 Volume 12
