DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] AC 562 (HL)

CASE: DONOGHUE v STEVENSON [1932] AC 562 (HL)

COURT JUDGEMENT: House of Lords (United Kingdom).

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 26 May 1932.

BENCH TYPE: Five-Law-Lord panel (appellate bench)

JUDGES: Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton, Lord Macmillan, Lord Buckmaster (dissenting), Lord Tomlin (dissenting)

PARTIES INVOLVED:

Appellant: May Donoghue, also referred to as Mrs. Donoghue.

Mrs. May Donoghue was an ordinary consumer who, in August 1928, visited a café in Paisley, Renfrewshire, with a friend. She was served a bottle of ginger beer, manufactured by Mr. David Stevenson, which was contained in an opaque bottle. Unbeknown to her or anyone else, the bottle contained the decomposed remains of a snail. After consuming part of the drink, she suffered from gastroenteritis and shock. With no direct contract between herself and the manufacturer, Mrs. Donoghue brought an action against Mr. Stevenson, thereby laying the foundation for the modern law of negligence.

Respondent:  David Stevenson (manufacturer of the ginger beer).

Mr. David Stevenson was a manufacturer of aerated waters, including ginger beer, in Paisley, Renfrewshire, Scotland. He operated as a commercial bottler and supplied beverages to local retailers and cafés. One of his ginger beer bottles, which was sold to the Wellmeadow Café, contained the decomposed remains of a snail. Following Mrs. Donoghue’s illness after consuming the drink, Stevenson was sued as the party responsible for the product’s safety.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On 26 August 1928, Mrs. May Donoghue went to the Wellmeadow Café in Paisley, Scotland, with a friend. Her friend bought her a bottle of ginger beer and some ice cream. The ginger beer had been produced by Mr. David Stevenson and was sold in a dark, opaque bottle that could not be checked from the outside.

Mrs. Donoghue poured part of the ginger beer over her ice cream and drank some of it. When the rest of the liquid was poured out, the remains of a decomposed snail came out of the bottle. She claimed that the shock of this discovery, together with what she had consumed, made her ill with gastroenteritis and nervous shock.

Due to the fact that her friend had bought the drink, Mrs. Donoghue had no contract with either the café owner or Mr. Stevenson. At the time, the general rule was that a person could only sue where a contract existed, and manufacturers were not normally liable to people they did not directly sell to. Despite this, Mrs. Donoghue took legal action against Mr. Stevenson. She argued that, as a manufacturer, he owed a duty of care to consumers to make sure his products were safe.

The main fact giving rise to the dispute was therefore the absence of any contract between the parties. The case raised the important question of whether a manufacturer could be held responsible in negligence to a consumer who had not bought directly from him.

ISSUES RAISED:

1. Whether the manufacturer owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer even though there is no contract between them.
2. Whether the manufacturer breached that duty, by failing to ensure that products are free from harmful defects before they reach consumers.
3. The role of foreseeability in negligence: whether harm to a consumer in such circumstances could be reasonably foreseen.
4. Whether a duty of care may exist in the absence of contractual privity, and how that fits within common law principles of liability.
5. Whether a manufacturer should be held liable for injury caused by a defect in a product when the defect becomes apparent only after sale and consumption.
6. The tension between expanding liability (for consumer protection) and limiting it (to avoid unfair burdens on manufacturers).

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES:

APPELLLANT.

The appellant, Mrs. Donoghue, through her counsel, argued that Mr. Stevenson, as a manufacturer, owed a duty of care to the ultimate consumer, notwithstanding the absence of a contractual relationship. Since the bottle was opaque and sealed, the consumer had no opportunity to inspect its contents. On this basis, it was contended that the manufacturer assumed responsibility for ensuring the product’s safety. It was further argued that harm to consumers was reasonably foreseeable if proper care was not taken in preparing food and beverages intended for human consumption.

Donoghue’s case also relied on the principle of res Ipsa loquitur. The discovery of a snail in the sealed bottle, it was argued, amounted to sufficient circumstantial evidence of negligence, given that such an occurrence would not have happened without fault. In addition, counsel drew on persuasive authorities such as Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 (CA)[1], which suggested that a duty of care arises when one’s conduct may foreseeably injure another, and the American case of MacPherson v Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382 (1916)[2], where the New York Court of Appeals recognized that manufacturers could be liable to consumers absent contractual privity.

RESPONDENT:

The respondent, Mr. Stevenson, advanced several counter-arguments. His counsel relied primarily on the principle of privity of contract, asserting that liability could not extend to third parties with whom the manufacturer had no contractual dealings. This position was supported by Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109, 152 ER 402,[3] which had established limits on liability in negligence. It was further contended that liability in negligence had traditionally been confined to narrow categories, such as products that were inherently dangerous or cases involving fraud or concealment, neither of which applied to ginger beer.

Stevenson’s counsel also placed significant reliance on Mullen v AG Barr & Co Ltd 1929 SC 461, [4] where the Court of Session declined to impose liability on a manufacturer in similar circumstances involving mice found in ginger beer bottles. Finally, it was argued that recognizing a general duty of care in this case would open the floodgates to an indeterminate number of claims, thereby imposing an excessive and uncontrollable burden on manufacturers.

JUDGEMENT/ FINAL DECISION

The House of Lords delivered its judgment on 26 May 1932. The court, by a majority of three to two, allowed Mrs. Donoghue’s appeal. The majority consisted of Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton and Lord Macmillan, while Lord Buckmaster and Lord Tomlin dissented.

The central finding was that Mr. Stevenson owed a duty of care to Mrs. Donoghue as the ultimate consumer of his product, even though no contract existed between them. The Lords held that where goods are sold in a sealed or opaque container which prevents inspection, the manufacturer must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions that could foreseeably cause injury to the consumer. This marked a departure from the older position that liability was limited to cases involving contractual privity or inherently dangerous products.

The appeal was therefore allowed, establishing that a manufacturer may be liable in negligence to a consumer who suffers harm due to defects in the product. There were no further orders for damages at this stage; rather, the decision clarified the law and remitted the matter for trial. The long-term importance of the judgment lay not in the orders made but in the recognition of the general principle of a duty of care in negligence.

LEGAL REASONING/RATIO DECIDENDI

The reasoning of the House of Lords in Donoghue v Stevenson transformed the law of negligence. The majority, led by Lord Atkin, held that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer where products are sold in such a way that no intermediate inspection is possible.[5]  Lord Atkin formulated the famous “neighbor principle”, stating that individuals must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions likely to injure their “neighbors,” defined as persons who are so closely and directly affected by one’s act that they ought reasonably to be kept in contemplation.

This reasoning rejected the narrow rule that liability could only arise out of contractual privity or inherently dangerous goods. Instead, the court grounded liability on the general principle of reasonable foreseeability of harm. Thus, even though Mrs. Donoghue had no contract with Mr. Stevenson, it was reasonably foreseeable that a failure to take care in bottling could directly cause injury to her as a consumer.

Several significant precedents were considered. The majority distinguished Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109, 152 ER 402, which limited liability to those in contractual privity. Lord Atkin drew support from Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 (CA), where Brett MR had suggested a broader duty of care in situations where one’s conduct foreseeably affects others. He also relied on the persuasive authority of the American case MacPherson v Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916), where Cardozo J held that a manufacturer of vehicles owed a duty to consumers notwithstanding absence of contract.

The ratio established a general principle of duty of care in negligence, applicable beyond manufacturers, and has since become the foundation of modern tort law.

CONCLUSION/ OBSERVATION

The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson marked a turning point in the law of negligence, as it confirmed that manufacturers owe a duty of care to consumers even without a contract. Lord Atkin’s neighbor principle provided a clear test for foreseeability, while Lord Macmillan’s obiter dictum that “the categories of negligence are never closed” showed the law’s flexibility. The dissenting views of Lords Buckmaster and Tomlin reminded the court of the risks of unlimited liability. Despite those concerns, the majority judgment laid the foundation for modern negligence, balancing fairness, duty, and public policy.

Reference(S):

[1] Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 (CA)

[2] Macpherson v Buick Motor Co 217 NY 382, 111 N.E 1050 (1916)

[3] Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M&W 109, 152 ER 402

[4] Mullen v AG Barr & Co Ltd 1929 SC 461 (Ct of Session)

[5] Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 (HL) (Lord Atkin)