Attorney General for India v. Satish & Another, (2021) INSC 762

1. CASE TITLE & CITATION

Attorney General for India v. Satish & Another, (2021) INSC 762

2. COURT NAME & BENCH

• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Bench: Justice U.U. Lalit, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, and Justice Bela M. Trivedi
• Bench Type: Three-Judge Bench (Division Bench)

3. DATE OF JUDGMENT

• 18 November 2021

4. PARTIES INVOLVED

• Appellants: Attorney General for India, National Commission for Women, and the State of Maharashtra
• Respondents: Satish (neighbour accused of sexually assaulting a 12-year-old girl) and another accused in a connected case

5. FACTS

• This case stemmed from an incident where a 12-year-old girl (referred to as the victim) was lured by her neighbor, Satish (the accused), into his home under the pretext of giving her guava on 14 of December, 2016. 
• Once inside, the accused pressed her breast and attempted to remove her clothes (salwar). The victim resisted by shouting, prompting the accused to press her mouth. The accused subsequently left the room and bolted the door from the outside, trapping the victim inside. 
• The victim’s mother, alerted by a neighbor who heard her screams and was searching for her daughter, found the girl crying inside the accused’s bolted room. 
• After learning about the incident from her daughter, the mother lodged a complaint against Satish with the police. The complaint was registered as Crime No. 405/2016 at Police Station Gittikhadan, Nagpur. When police arrived, the accused was found attempting suicide by hanging himself and was sent for medical treatment. 
• The Special Court, after reviewing the evidence, convicted Satish under sections 342 (Punishment for wrongful confinement), 354 (Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty), and 363 (Punishment for kidnapping) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 8 (Punishment for sexual assault) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). 
• Satish appealed this decision to the Bombay High Court, which acquitted him under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, while upholding his convictions under sections 342 and 354 of the IPC for minor offenses. 
• Justice Pushpa Ganediwala of the Bombay High Court famously reasoned that the act of pressing the 12-year-old victim’s breast, without explicit details about the removal of her top or insertion of the accused’s hand, did not fall within the definition of “sexual assault” under the POCSO Act, thereby necessitating “skin-to-skin” contact for such an offense. 
• This interpretation by the Bombay High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court of India in appeals filed by the Attorney General for India, the National Commission for Women, and the State of Maharashtra. 
• The Supreme Court stayed the High Court’s decision, calling it a ‘Dangerous precedent’. A three-judge bench (Justices U.U. Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat, and Bela M. Trivedi) delivered the judgment, quashed the Bombay High Court, holding the sexual intent is sufficient even without Skin-to-Skin contact. 

6. ISSUES

1. Whether direct ‘skin-to-skin’ contact is necessary to prove sexual assault under section 7 of the POCSO ACT?
2. Whether the act of touching a child’s sexual parts with sexual intent, even through clothing amounts to sexual assault?
3. Whether the Bombay High Court’s interpretations of Section 7 weakened the object and purpose of the POCSO Act?

        7.ARGUMENTS

            CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS 

1. Contentions of the Attorney General for India (Mr. K.K. Venugopal) 

• The Bombay High Court wrongly read section 7 of POCSO, since skin-to-skin contact is not an ingredient of sexual assault under section 8. 
• Parliament deliberately prescribed a minimum punishment of 3 years under Section 7 for acts like groping a child’s breast, and the High Court erred in calling it ‘too stringent’.
• Section 354 IPC (outraging modesty of a woman) cannot apply to a 12-year-old child; POCSO, being a special law, was specifically enacted to protect children who are more vulnerable.
• The judgment, if upheld, would lead to absurd results e.g., an offender wearing gloves or making the child wear clothes could escape liability for sexual assault.
• The ruling undermines the legislative intent of POCSO and weakens child protection. The AG cited the Kailash Satyarthi Report on POCSO cases to highlight the seriousness of the issue.
• Finally AG urged that the Bombay High Court’s judgement in its judgement is very dangerous and outrageous precedent. 

2. Contentions of the National Commission for Women (NCW) (Sr. Adv. Geetha Luthra)

• Section 7 POCSO does not require skin-to-skin contact; physical contact with sexual intent is enough.
• Referred to U.S. Court of Appeals decisions where sexual assault was held not to require direct skin contact.
• The phrase “any other act with sexual intent” is generic and all-encompassing; it cannot be restricted using the rule of ejusdem generis, as wrongly done by the High Court.
• All four acts in this case (touching, attempted disrobing, confinement, etc.) clearly amounted to sexual assault under Section 7; the High Court erred in limiting it to IPC Section 354.

3. Contentions of Amicus Curiae (Sr. Adv. Siddharth Dave)

• The determinative factor under Section 7 is whether the act was committed with sexual intent.
• The legislature deliberately went beyond just sexual organs (breast, vagina, penis, etc.) and included other body parts, making sexual intent the test.
• Relied on precedents (including HC’s own reasoning in other cases) to argue that skin-to-skin contact is not required for an offense of sexual assault under POCSO.
• Justice U.U. Lalit noted that the court’s central question was limited to whether “skin-to-skin” contact is necessary under Section 7, not the broader interpretation of the second part of Section 7.

4. Contentions of State of Maharashtra 

• argued that the High Court’s restrictive reading of Section 7 would dilute the protective purpose of the Act and defeat the very object of safeguarding children from sexual abuse.

       5.CONTENTIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED

1. argued that the term “assault” under the IPC cannot automatically be equated with “sexual assault” under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, since both operate in different legal contexts.
2. While skin-to-skin contact may not be required for the first part of Section 7 (involving touching of sexual parts such as breasts, vagina, penis, or anus), the second part of the provision, covering “any other act with sexual intent” was claimed to necessarily require direct skin contact.
3. Given that Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act impose a reverse burden on the accused (presuming guilt unless disproved), it was submitted that Section 7 must be strictly construed. Expanding its scope would unfairly increase the liability of the accused.
4. Where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, the law must be interpreted in favor of the accused. Hence, the narrower reading of Section 7 should apply.
5. The defense also pointed to inconsistencies and contradictions in the prosecution’s case, arguing that such unreliable evidence should not be the basis for a conviction under the POCSO Act.

        6.JUDGMENT / FINAL DECISION

• The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s ruling.
• It held that sexual intent is the essential element for constituting the offence under Section 7 POCSO, and not the way physical contact occurs.
• Acts involving contact through clothing, if accompanied by sexual intent, fall within the ambit of “sexual assault.”
• The Court restored the convictions under Section 8 POCSO.

        8.RATIONALE/ RATIO DECIDENDI

            SC’s reliance and interpretation- 

• The Supreme Court applied the rule of purposive interpretation, emphasizing that provisions must be read in harmony with the object of the POCSO Act, i.e., ensuring children’s safety and protection from sexual abuse. It relied on precedents such as J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan and Balaram Kumawat v. Union of India.
• The Court held that “touch” and “physical contact” in Section 7 of the POCSO Act are interchangeable and cannot be restricted to “skin-to-skin” contact. The essential ingredient of the offence is sexual intent, not the manner of contact.
• The Court ruled that a narrow interpretation would frustrate the very purpose of the Act, as it would exclude acts done with clothes, gloves, or coverings despite sexual intent. It applied the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, stressing that a statute should be interpreted to give effect rather than defeat its purpose.
• The judgment rejected the accused’s reliance on reverse burden (Sections 29–30 POCSO) and rule of lenity, clarifying that strict construction does not mean pedantic or absurd construction. Ambiguity cannot be artificially created where the text and intent are clear.
• The Court conclusively set aside the High Court’s “skin-to-skin” interpretation, holding that any touching with sexual intent constitutes sexual assault under Section 7. While the ruling strongly reinforced child protection, the case exposed drafting ambiguities in the Act and highlighted how literal judicial interpretation could dilute legislative safeguards.

         10.Decision of the court:

• The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, sexual intent is the decisive factor for determining an act of sexual assault. Consequently, the Bombay High Court erred in acquitting Accused Satish by holding that absence of “skin-to-skin contact” negated the offence. Likewise, in the case of Accused Libnus, the Apex Court held that the High Court’s reasoning was entirely flawed, since acts such as entering the prosecutrix’s house with sexual intent, holding her hands, unzipping his pants, and exposing himself clearly fell within the ambit of the second part of Section 7- “any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders and restored the convictions passed by the Special Courts against both accused.

         11.Defects of Law:

• Ambiguity in section 7- “Touch and Physical Contact” – this is the core defect in law. The words were not defined clearly, which allowed the Bombay High Court to narrow them down to mean “Skin-to-skin” contact. 
• Unclear standard for proving ‘Sexual Intent’ of the accused- the Act makes sexual Intent the most essential ingredient, but gives no statutory guidelines on how courts should infer or prove it. This creates room for inconsistent judgements, since different judges may interpret intent differently. In law for child protection, this vagueness can lead to misinterpretation or either criminalize innocent acts or under-criminalize abusive conduct.